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1. Introduction

N

ewspaper reports in Western Europe and the publications of reputable hu-

man rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Interna-

tional, give the impression that innocent villagers are being indiscriminately killed
by coalition forces in Afghanistan. l News reports also suggest that Afghans complain of the lack of physical security and of very slow progress in the development
of physical and social infrastructure. The issue is not, in this context, whether such
claim s are well founded. The perception of the Afghans and of the human rights
groups is that civilians are being killed unnecessarily and, by implication, unlawfully. The forces involved claim to be showing the most rigorous adherence to the
requirements of the law of armed conflict.2 Part of the explanation for the gap in
perceptions may be that the Afghans and the human rights groups are thinking in
terms of respect for human rights law, in the context of a law and order paradigm,
whereas the military forces are thinking exclusively in terms of the law of arm ed
conflict. This raises the question of the relevance of human rights law to the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan, the subject of this article.
Before embarking o n an analysis of the principal questions at issue, it is necessary to m ake a number of preliminary points. The first is that it will be assumed that
two, legally significantly different operations are being conducted in Afghanistan .
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One is the International Security Assistance Force (lSAF) operation, which has a
Security Council mandate and is there to assist the government of Afghanistan} It
is said to be dealing with an insurgency, led by the Taliban, and to be governed by
the rules applicable in non-international armed conflict. The second is O peration
Enduring Freedom, which is said to be a continuation of the conflict which started
in 200 1 between an ad hoc coalition, working with the Northern Alliance, and the
Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. This conflict is said to be international in nature. This
characterization of the conflict(s) is not without controversy but will not be further
explored here.
The second preliminary point concerns the nature of human rights law. Lawyers
with certain armed forces shy away from anything to do with human rights law
and, by extension, with human rights more generally, perhaps at least in part owing
to fear of the unknown. 4 They claim that it has nothing to do with them and their
operations, a claim that, in such broad terms, is patently untrue. This article cannot
hope to provide a general introduction to human rights law; fo r that, readers need
to seek elsewhere. S It is, nevertheless, necessary to highlight certain features of this
body of rules. First, there is a difference between human rights law and human
rights. The former refers to legal obligations of States. The focus will be principally
on treaty law, which is of course subject to ratification. The main emphasis will be
on the international treaties, notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with only occasional reference to the regional treaties. It should not
be forgotten, however, that there are human rights mechanisms that, ultimately,
owe their existence to the UN Charter. 6 All States are subject to their scrutiny. The
norms, respect for which they monitor, are either part of customary human rights
law or part of Charter law. Human rights more generally refers to values and precepts that may (or should) be the basis of policy decisions, such as the rule oflaw,
democracy, participation, transparency and accountability. Human rights in this
sense is part of the "good governance" agenda.
Second, human rights law is civil in character, like any other area of public international law. States found to have violated human rights law may be required to
amend their law and to make restitution. The failure to investigate an alleged human
rights violation and, where appropriate, to institute domestic criminal proceedings
may be a violation of human rights law but the enforcement of that body of law at
the regional or international level does not involve criminal proceedings. 7 The individual perpetrator is not the human rights violator. The State which is responsible for the non-investigation will be held responsible under human rights law. This
points to a significant difference between human rights law and the law of armed
conflict. The former only binds the State. Human rights law is not based on the
bond of citizenship. The rights are said to be inherent in every human being. This
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means that they do not need to be earned and are not dependent upon good behavior. Human rights law is about the relationship between those who exercise authority and those subjected to its exercise. It applies to anyone subject to the exercise
of such authority or jurisdiction, a concept that will be examined further below.
Third, human rights law contains both positive and negative obligations. Not
only is there the negative obligation, for example, not to torture. Only State agents
can trigger responsibility for breach of the negative obligation. There is also a positive obligation to protect persons from torture, both at the hands of State agents
and third parties. This is generally satisfied by having a properly functioning legal
system that penalizes the behavior in question and an effective system ofinvestigation and prosecution that ensures that wrongdoers are punished.lI ln some circumstances, it may require more than that in the way of protection. 9
The fourth element represents a sweeping generalization. Provided that caveat
is not forgotten, the claim may still offer useful insights. Human rights law, at least
as enforced by regional human rights courts, is designed principally to be applied
after the event. It provides general principles which enable a judge to determine in
a precise set of circumstances whether a rule has been violated. It is capable of considerable fine-tuning, particularly with the development over time of fairly consistent case law. What permits such fine- tuning is the use oflimitation clauses, which
are an intrinsic part of the elaboration of many r ights. For example, there is no absolute right of freedom of expression. Rather, the starting point is that such a right
exists but it can be subject to restrictions imposed by law and based on one or more
generally defined grounds, on condition that the limitation is both necessary and
proportionate.]OIn the case of negative obligations, responsibility often appears to
be based on the result. O ne exception is responsibility for unlawful killings, where
what the reasonable perpetrator thought would obviously be relevant. In contrast,
the law of armed conflict is designed to provide guidance to armed forces at the
time decisions are made and actions undertaken. The emphasis in criminal proceedings on what was known at the time should avoid the danger that determinations of responsibility after the event will be based on the twenty-twenty vision of
hindsight. ]] The fme-tuning occurs in the m ind of the commander, rather than
that ofthe judge.
The fifth issue is that the starting point of human rights law is the protected interest or right. Any limitations or exceptions have to be interpreted restrictive1y. In the
case of the law of armed conflict, the law itself represents a balance. One side of that
balance should not be interpreted restrictively in relation to the other. This is a possible explanation for the way in which certain human rights groups, on occasion, appear to interpret the law of armed conflict; they are treating the protection of
civilians, for example, as the starting point and any restrictions as an exception.
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This article will consider five issues: first, whether human rights law remains applicable when the law of armed conflict is applicable;1 2 second, whether human
rights obligations apply extraterritorially; third, the impact ofthe territorial State's
human rights obligations for other States assisting it; fourth, the effect of a Security
Council mandate on legal obligations that would otherwise be applicable; and, finally, whether human rights notions cowd offer useful guidance to armed forces,
whether or not human rights law is applicable de jure.
It is dear that the interplay between human rights law and the law of armed conflict is currently a source of confusion and the subject of debate. There are plausible
explanations for how we have come to find ourselves in this muddle. The law of
armed conflict, historically, regulated inter-State conflicts and civil wars of such intensity that they resembled inter-State conflicts. In view of the impact of the latter
on, for example, trade and ports, third States had to recognize belligerency to protect their rights as neutrals. u In 1949, there was the first attempt in treaty law to
regwate every type of internal conflict, provided that it constituted an armed conflict and not merely isolated and sporadic acts of violence. 14 Traditionally, such
conflicts had been purely the province of domestic law, including constitutional
law, criminal law and civil liberties. Domestic law determined the circumstances in
which an emergency could be declared. It also dealt with the consequences of such
an emergency, including civil liberties safeguards which could not be suspended.
In other words, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions l5 made inroads,
albeit very minimal ones, in the relationship between the individual and the
State. 16 At about the same time, domestic civil liberties rwes surfaced on the international plane as human rights law. 17 The shift from domestic to intemationallaw
owed much to the desire to prevent what was perceived to have contributed to the
causes of the Second World War and to the appalling conduct of those exercising
governmental authority during the course of the war, in both national and occupied territory. The respect for human rights was seen as a way of ensuring that people did not "have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression ."ls It was necessary to reinforce domestic provisions, designed to prevent the misuse of authority but which could be subverted, with international
guarantees. The regional and international enforcement of human rights law is not
an end in itself. It is designed to persuade a State to adopt the necessary measures at
the domestic level.
It was recognized that States might well have to deal with emergencies, in which
certain rights might be subject to unusual restrictions, but it was made dear that,
even in such circumstances, certain guarantees had to be maintained. In other
words, the very raison d'Ure for the international spine-stiffening of domestic civil
liberties rules was the risk of abuse and misuse of governmental authority in
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emergencies or periods of conflict. The law sought to prevent the situation from
deteriorating to that level but, if it did so, the law sought to ensure that things did
not get even worse. From the outset then, one could have predicted overlap between the new inroads made by the law of armed conflict into internal conflicts and
the internationalization of domestic constitutional and civil liberties guarantees.
Superficially, there may be an obvious solution for those who seek to keep the law
of armed conflict and human rights law separate, rather than to seek an accommodation between the two bodies of rules. It wouJd involve eliminating all law of
armed conflict rules applicable in non-international armed conflict, other than
perhaps those non-international conflicts which resemble international armed
conflicts. Human rights law wouJd be the only body of rules reguJating affairs
within a State, including armed conflict. Quite apart from the problem of eliminating a widely accepted body of rules l9 and the question of the desirability of doing
so, it is difficult to see how such a rigid distinction could be made. What wouJd
happen to those ru1es applicable within a State's own territory during international
anned conflict?20 Would States be willing to assist other States dealing with an insurgency, if they were subject to human rights law, without any law of anned conflictinspired modification?21
Where we are at present may appear chaotic and confused but the only solution
is to find a way forward, not back. The first step is to seek to clarify the relationship
between the two bodies of rules.

II. Whether Human Rights Law Remains Applicable When the
Law of Anned Conflict Is Applicable
Before addressing the principal question, it is again necessary to make two preliminary points. First, as any legal system develops, it has to address the question of the
boundary between two sets of rules. An obvious example in the context of domestic
law is the boundary between contract law and tort. Where a party to a contract discharges his obligation negligently, occasioning loss to the other party, should the
claim be brought for breach of contract or for negligence? There is no question of
arbitrarily restricting either body of r ules. It is a matter of finding a suitable accommodation . The same issue has already arisen and been dealt with in international
law. The law of the sea, for example, has had to find a way to accommodate the free
passage rights of warships, including submarines, and the need of the coastal State to
regulate and protect a range of interests and activities in the territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone. 22 In other words, there is nothing new or
unique in the potential overlap of the law of armed conflict and human rights law.
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The second point is that the relationship between the two bodies of rules is a
general question, rather than one relating to particular rules. It has never been suggested, for example, that one answer could be given for rules of international
armed conflict and another for rules of non-international armed conflict. Either
the applicability of the law of armed conflict has the effect of "turning off' the applicabilityofhuman rights law or it does not. This is a furth er reason why the solution discussed at the end of the introduction is, in fact, no solution.
Three separate questions need to be distinguished. The first is whether hwnan
rights law remains applicable at all when the law of armed conflict is applicable. If
that is answered in the affirmative, two further, related questions become relevant.
First, to what extent is human rights law applicable and, second, how, if at all, are
the relevant human rights norms affected by the applicability of the law of armed
conflict?
A. Whether Human Rights Law Is Applicable at All
There is overwhelming evidence that human rights law does remain applicable
when the law of armed conflict is applicable. This is to be found in treaty law, particularly those treaties dealing with civil and political rights. The derogation
clausesB provide that certain rights remain applicable even during "war or other
public emergency."z.t Such situations clearly include ones in which the law of
armed conflict will also be applicable. A large majority of States are bound by one
or more of such treaties. 25 State practice confirms this initial impression. As far as
political organs are concerned, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the
Human Rights Council (and its predecessor, the UN Commission on Human
Rights) have passed both subject and situation-specific resolutions in which reference is made to both human rights law and the law of armed conflict.26 In the case
of judicial and quasi-judicial organs, the International Court of Justice (lCn stated
clearly that human rights law remains applicable in all circumstances, subject only to
derogation.21 The principal human rights treaty monitoring body at the internationallevel, the Human Rights Committee, in its general comment on states of emergency,28 in its concluding obselVations on State reports 29 and in determinations in
individual cases, has equally made it dear that hwnan rights law is not displaced by
the applicability of the law of armed conflict.30 The most relevant, in this context, of
the Special Procedures have also expressed concerns framed in terms of human
rights law in situations in which the law of armed conflict was applicable.}l At the regional level, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, the former European Commission of Human
Rights and the former and present European Court of Human Rights, and the African
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Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights have also applied hwnan rights law in
circumstances in which the law of anned conflict was clearly applicable.
The only currently dissenting view is that of two States: Israel and the United
States. Israel appears never to have disputed the applicability of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Israel itself, even though, as a party to actual and/or arguable armed conflicts, it has rights and obligations under the law of
armed conflict which have an impact within Israel. 32 Its objection has focused on
theapplicabilityofhuman rights law in occupied territory, which involves both the
relationship with the law of armed conflict and the question of the extraterritorial
applicability of human rights law.3) Since the overwhelming weight of evidence
suggests that the applicability of the law of armed conflict does not displace that of
human rights law, the question then becomes whether Israel and the United States
can claim to be persistent objectors. The first difficulty for the United States is that,
at the time of its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the approach of the Human Rights Committee was already clear. The failure of the United States to enter a reservation or interpretative declaration on this
specific question calls into question the persistence of any alleged objection.3 4 A
similar argument could be made in relation to Israel, which ratified the International Covenant only eight months earlier, on October 3, 1991 . First, in assessing
such a possible claim, it should be noted that the relevant treaty language is unambiguous. Presumably, the clearer the rule, the more is expected of a would-be persistent objector. Second, it is not clear whether the persistent-objector principle
applies to every type of rule of international law. The rule at issue here is about the
relationship between the two bodies of rules, rather than a rule of conduct. It is not
clear whether that makes a difference. The third difficulty is more fundamental. In
the principal ICI decision addressing the persistent-objector principle, the AngloNorwegian FisheriesJurisdiction Case, it was not the persistence of Norway's objections that was decisive but the acceptance of or acquiescence in those objections by
the United Kingdom. 3S Whose acceptance of an objection is required under human
rights law? In particular, how important is the lack of acceptance by a treaty monitoring body, as opposed to other High Contracting Parties? Human rights treaties
are particular, but not unique, in creating "objective" obligations. 36 They are not
simply reciprocal inter-State undertakings. Does this imply that States have delegated the power to accept or reject alleged persistent objection to the treaty monitoring body? Even if that is not the case, is the silence of other High Contracting
Parties evidence of acceptance, in the face of the opposition of the treaty monitoring body? This is not the only area where the rules of international law have failed
to keep pace with the development of new types of international machineryY
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It seems clear that human rights law remains applicable even when the law of
armed conflict is applicable and it seems doubtful that Israel and the United States
can avoid that conclusion by seeking to rely on the persistent-objector principle.
B. To What Extent Is Human Rights Law Applicable When the Law of Armed
Conflict Is Applicable?
The General Assembly and the Security Council have not addressed this specific issue. Since their resolutions confirm that both human rights law and the law of
armed conflict may be simultaneously applicable but do not explain the extent to
which the former is applicable, they should probably be interpreted as saying "to
the extent that" human rights law is applicable.
The IC] has been much more specific. In the Advisory Opinion The Legal Conseqllences ofthe Constrlldiml ofa Wall in the OCCllpied Palestinian Territory, the Court
stated that human rights law remains applicable subject only to derogation. 38 It
then applied its statement in a contentious case, Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo,39 where it found violations of both the law of anned conflict (Article 51
of Additional Protocol I) and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (prohibition of arbitrary killings) on the basis of the same facts. The
facts fo und were stark and involved a non-derogable right. The case therefore
sheds little light on the extent to which human rights law was applicable.
On the basis of the Ie ] statement in the Advisory Opinion, all non-derogable
rights remain applicable in the usual way. It also implies that if a State has not chosen to derogate, the full range of human rights obligations will be applicable. At this
point it is necessary to explain briefly what is meant by derogation under human
rights law.
Some, but not all, human rights treaties provide a facility for States. In situations of public emergency threatening the life of the nation, they may modify
some, but not all, of their human rights obligations but any such modification has
to be both necessary and proportionate. States are free not to derogate, even in a
situation in which they would be legally entitled to do so. There is a range of reasons why a State might fail to derogate. The first is that lawyers in the relevant government department may simply not think of it. This could either be the product
of negligence or incompetence on the part of the relevant governmental authorities or they may not take their international law, or at least their human rights law,
obligations sufficiently seriously to conform to the procedural requirements. Another possible explanation could be that the State does not wish to signal the existence of an emergency on its territory. While this is thought to be a common
explanation for the unwillingness of States to acknowledge the applicability of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, this appears less convincing as an
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explanation for non-derogation. If a State wishes to take measures not nonnally
permitted under human rights law. it is required to derogate. It is clear that a public emergency does not de jure trigger the modified applicability of human rights
law. This is in contrast to the law of armed conflict. which is applicable by virtue of
the facts and whether or not the State(s) in question concede(s) its applicability. It
is therefore easy to envisage a situation in which a State has not derogated. and in
which the full range of human rights obligations are applicable according to the
ICJ. but in which the law of armed conflict is applicable.40 It is not clear whether a
State which is assisting a territorial State in dealing with a non-international
armed confli ct can rely on the derogation of the latter or whether it can derogate
in its own right. based on an emergency threatening the life of the nation outside
its own territory.
It is up to the human rights body to determine whether the situation represents
a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.4l The body will allow the
State a "margin of appreciation" in its characterization of the situation. 42 Under
the human rights treaties. the State is required to notify a designated authority that
it is invoking its power to derogate..f3 It has to provide an indication of which obligations it is derogating fro m. what measures it has introduced and an explanation
of the need for those measures. Certain provisions. non -derogable rights. cannot
be modified in any circumstances. While the list of non-derogable rights varies
from treat y to treaty. they all include the prohibition of arbitrary killings. torture 44
and slavery and do not include the provision dealing with detention.4s
Just because a right is potentially derogable does not mean that the right as a
whole can be suspended. As indicated above. any exceptional restriction has to be
both necessary and proportionate. 46 Furthermore. certain restrictions are going to
be more difficult to justify than others. For example. while it may be possible to justify the creation of a new ground of detention, such as internment or administrative detention. it will be difficult to justify suspension of all form of review of
lawfulness of detention {1labeas corpus and amparo) ..f'
This brief explanation of derogation helps put in context the statement of the
IC] that human rights law remains fully applicable. subject only to derogation.
In General Comment No. 29, the Human Rights Committee has provided a
much fuller analysis of the extent to which human rights law remains applicable
during public emergencies.4! It first clarified the types of situations in which derogation is possible.49 It emphasized that the limitation clauses enable the Committee
to address a range of troubled situations without recourse to derogation. SO The
Committee pointed out that for a situation to be sufficiently grave as to justify derogation will generally mean that the law of armed conflict. in the form of at least
Common Article 3. will also be applicable.51 That reduces the chance of there being
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a gap, where some human rights guarantees have been withdrawn but law of armed
conflict protections are not available. 52 The Committee identifies three basic principles. First, non-derogable rights remain applicable at all times.53 The second and
third principles concern potentially derogable rights. A requirement of h wnan
rights law which is prima faciederogable may. in effect, be non-derogable ifit plays
a vital role in preventing violations of a non-derogable right. S4 An obvious example
is review of lawfulness of detention, which is said to playa key role in preventing
torture and other fonus of proscribed ill treatment. It is not that this element of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, dealing with detention, is added to the list of non-derogable rights. That would fly in the face of the
express words of the treaty. It is rather that States are likely to find it impossible to
justify the necessity of the total extinction of the right, even though they may be
able to explain the necessity of changes in its usual modalities. This second principle
may apply to specific elements in the context of a wider right. The third principle
concerns the essence or core of the wider right itself. The Committee suggested that
it would be hard to justify the suspension of the very essence of a right, even if various constituent elements could be modified. 55 Again, an obvious example exists in
the field of detention. While, in an emergency, it may be possible to create additional grounds of detention, to modify the modalities of review of lawfulness and
to lengthen the period during which a person may be held before being brought before a judicial officer, it would never be possible to justify unacknowledged detention (disappearances).56To hold othefW"ise would be to deprive the detainees of all
protection of the law.
When monitoring State reports, the H wnan Rights Committee has not always
made clear, in the Concluding Observations, the precise basis of its analysis. When
the Committee raises one issue but not another, it is not clear whether its failure to
raise the second is because the alleged violation would, on account of the circumstances, be covered by the operation of a limitation clause or because it would be
covered by a derogation or because it did not have the time to consider the issue.5'
All that can be said in general ter ms is that the practice of the Committee in its
Concluding Observations appears to reflect General Comment No. 29. It is also
noteworthy that no State has objected to the General Comment, even though three
States reacted to General Comment No. 24 on reservations.:>8 At the very least, this
suggests that the United States, the United Kingdom and France (the three States in
question ) had no objection to General Comment No. 29. 59
The Human Rights Committee has dealt fairly regularly with traditional noninternational armed conflicts, that is to sayan armed con flict between two groups
on the territory of one State, where the State itself may be a party to the conflict.60 It
has also dealt with situations of occupation and, less frequently, with States
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engaged in peace support operations outside national borders.61It is less clear how
it would deal with the relevance of human rights law to an international armed
conflict. The ICJ's statements are in fact contradictory. On the one hand, it has said
that human rights law remains applicable in all situations, subject only to derogation, which implies that that body of law is relevant even in relation to the conduct
of military operations.62 On the other hand, the Court has stated,
As regards the relationship between international hwnanitarian law and human rights
law, there are thus th ree possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of
international hwnanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of hwnan rights
law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. 63

This implies that there are situations not regulated by human rights law but, given
the earlier comment, it is not clear what those might be.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights offer a more complicated picture. They apply human
rights law, taking account of any derogation, in situations of emergency.6-I In some
circumstances, however, they will take account of the law of armed conflict in interpreting human rights law. 6s They do so proprio motu. They only make a finding
of violation of human rights law, not of the law of armed conflict. What is less clear
is whether they take account of the latter in all situations in which it may be relevant. If not, what criteria are they applying? Does it depend on the issue and/or
whether there is a relevant and specific rule of the law of armed conflict?M
The European Court of Human Rights and the former European Commission
of Human Rights have not articulated a view of the relevance of the law of armed
conflict, even though they have dealt with situations subject, or arguably subject, to
non -international armed conflict, such as Northern Ireland, Southeast Turkey and
Chechnya, and even an international armed conflict, the conflict between Turkey
and Cyprus. In some cases, the applicant's legal representative raised the relevant
law of armed conflict rule, usually to reinforce the human rights law rule. In other
words, it is not that the issue has not been raised before the European human rights
institutions. To date, it would appear that, in all or virtually all cases of actual or
possible non-international armed conflict, the act would have been in breach of
both human rights law and the law of armed conflict. In those situations, the
European human rights bodies have applied human rights law in the normal way,
subject only to derogation where applicable. Most notably, the European Commission of Human Rights failed to apply the law of armed conflict to determine the
lawfulness of the detention of prisoners of war in the conflict between Turkey and
CypruS.67 Turkey had not submitted notice of derogation under which it could
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have introduced a ground of detention not nonnally lawful. The detention of prisoners of war was therefore found to be unlawful! One of the ways in which the Court
has avoided having to face the issue is as a result of its view of the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law, which will be discussed in the next section.
C. How Are the Relevant H uman Rights Norms Affected by the Applicability
of the Law of Armed Conflict?
The focus in this subsection will be on the human rights norms dealing with killings and detention. It should be noted that other rights are also relevant, notably
those relating to due process, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right
to a remedy, particularly when States are assisting another State. 68
Superficially, there should be no real difficulty in reconciling human rights law
and the law of armed conflict for the Human Rights Committee, and for the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. In both cases, the human rights provision prohibits arbitrary killings. 69 The right is non-derogable. 70 What would be arbitrary in a peacetime context, in which the framework of analysis is a law and order paradigm, is not the
same as what would be arbitrary in a law of armed conflict context. It would be
straightforward for the human rights monitoring bodies to interpret "arbitrary" as
meaning that a killing in conformity with the law of armed conflict was not arbitrary in a conflict context or at least where it occurred as part of a military operation. It should be noted that this would represent a reduction in the current level of
protection in non-international anned conflicts, where the framework applied is
usually the law and order paradigm.71
There is, however, a real difficulty for parties to the European Convention for
Human Rights. The provision on the use of potentially lethal force lists exhaustively
the only grounds on which State agents may resort to such a use of force.72 It is
based on the law and order paradigm. The derogation provision expressly envisages
the possibility of derogation so as to pennit "lawful acts of war."13 In order to invoke the provision, the State would have to derogate. No State has ever derogated
from Article 2 of the Convention, whether involved in a non-international anned
conflict or international armed conflict and whether the conflict was in national
territory or extraterritorial. Since the law of armed conflict is not applicable by
virtue of its being invoked but by virtue of the facts, it might be open to the European Court of Human Rights to choose to use the law of armed conflict as a frame
of reference.7 4 It has not yet chosen to do so in relation to non-international
armed conflicts in national territoryJs It has generally been able to avoid the issue
in extraterritorial situations. The Court m ay have to confront the issue in the
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inter-State case introduced by Georgia against Russia and the many individual
cases brought by Georgians and Russians.
In the case of detention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights again prohibit arbitrary
detention.76 The provisions are potentially derogableP There are elements to the
right which may be modified but from which it is unlikely that States will be allowed to depart completely, notably the provision for review of detention. 78 It
seems dear that a State may, by derogation, introduce additional exceptional
grounds of detention. It is not dear whether a State needs to derogate in order to
justify internment or administrative detention.79 The case law makes it dear that
detention has to be lawfully authorized. The law of armed conflict itself provides
legal authority for detention under Geneva Conventions III and IV in international
armed conflicts. There is no equivalent provision in relation to non-international
armed conflicts. Additional Protocol II recognizes that people may be detained and
provides guarantees for such detainees but it does not itself authorize detention.
This is not surprising, since the underlying asswnption is that the fighting is occurring in the territory of one State and the grounds of detention would be expected to
be regulated by the domestic law of that State. This is most likely to be a problem
where States are involved in an extraterritorial non-international armed conflict.
That will be discussed in the following sections.
The situation is different for parties to the European Convention for Human
Rights. Again, the Convention does not prohibit arbitrary detention but lists
exhaustively the only legitimate grounds of detention. so In order to introduce additional grounds, a State is required to derogate. Ifit does so, it may be able to justify the introduction of internment or administrative detention. 81 The issue of
extraterritorial detention will be examined in the next section.
It therefore appears that it maybe possible for at least some human rights bodies
to accommodate the law of armed conflict but that it may be necessary to derogate
to make lawful exceptional grounds of detention. It was also seen that the application of the law of armed conflict would entail the reduction of existing protection
in relation to arbitrary killings, at least in non-international armed conflicts. Hwnan
rights bodies can take account of the law of armed conflict but should they do so
and, if so, in what circumstances?
When dealing with the inter-relationship between the law of armed conflict and
hwnan rights law, the IC] referred to the former as the lex specialis. In some ways,
this is unhelpful because lex specialis more easily applies to a vertical relationship
between two areas oflaw.82 When dealing with a commercial tenancy, any special
rules regarding such tenancies are the lex specialis as compared to general rules on
tenancies. In this case, however, two separate legal areas are bumping into one
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another. The relationship is horizontal, rather than vertical. Nevertheless, it is clear
in general terms what the Ie) is saying. Law of armed conflict rules are best suited
to conflict situations because they have been designed for that context. What is not
clear is what precisely that means in practice. Does it mean that in conflict situations all hwnan rights norms should be interpreted in the light of the law of armed
conflict, so that no violation will be found if there is no violation of that body of
law? That would be unworkable. There is nothing in the law of armed conflict
about the right to marry. The mere fact that suspending the right to marry would
not violate the law of armed conflict, which does not address the issue, is hardly
sufficient ground for suspending the human rights provision. Another possibility
would be that a human rights norm should only be affected by the law of armed
conflict where there is a relevant law of armed conflict provision. This would lead
to the bizarre result that the law of armed conflict would affect killings and detention but not the right to demonstrate. 83 It has also been suggested that a human
rights body should move backward and forward between the two areas of law, depending on the issue. 84 On that basis, the law of armed conflict would deal with
grounds of detention and review of detention in international armed conflicts but
not in non-international armed conflicts. Since the law of armed conflict does not
define "court" or "tribunal," the test to be applied would be a human rights law
test. With regard to issues such as the right to swnmon witnesses, where there is
again no provision in the law of armed conflict, reliance would be placed on human rights law. It is submitted that the to-ing and fro-ing between two legal regimes is unworkable in practice. It is rather as though parts of a Mercedes were
fitted to a VW Beetle. Human rights law might offer useful guidance as to the issues
which need to be addressed, but to suggest that human rights law due processguarantees should apply in the normal way would again lead to bizarre results. It would
be more workable if a State had derogated from the usual due process guarantees,
not by eliminating the guarantees but by modifying them. It is too soon to know
how the lex specialis rule is going to be applied in practice. A practical way fOlWard
will be suggested in the conclusion.
It is clear that to some extent human rights law remains applicable in situations
of conflict, particularly non -international armed conflict, but the precise extent of
that co-applicability and the manner in which the law of armed conflict impacts
upon the interpretation of human rights law is not yet clear.

Ill. The Extraterritorial Applicability of Human Rights
lfhuman rights law only applies within a State's territory, this has very significant
implications for the relationship between that body of law and the law of armed
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conflict. It would mean that the issue of the overlap between the two would only be
relevant in non-international armed conflict and in relation to the State's acts and
omissions in its own territory during an international armed conflict. If h uman
rights law applies extraterritorially, the key question becomes to what extent and to
what types of activities it is applicable.8S
The human rights com munity, in advocating for extraterritorial applicability of
human rights law, is concerned with the risk of lack of accountability. It fears that
the State would be allowed to do outside national territory what it cannot do within
national territory. If this were the only basis on which the argument was constructed , it would be misconceived. The human rights community is forgetting accountability under the law of ar med conflict. Its concern might be more specific.
While there is theoretical accountability under the law of armed conflict, it can
hardly be described as effective. In principle, subject to acceptance of the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction, a victim State could bring a complaint against a perpetrator State. In fact, the issue of jurisdiction poses a significant barrier. Even when
such a case is possible, in practice it is very rare for States to bring alleged violations
of the law of armed conflict before the ICJ.S6 It is not clear whether a non -victim
State could bring such a case, based on the erga otnnes character of law of armed
conflict obligations. 87 If that is not possible, there are very real difficulties in bringing alleged breaches of the law of armed conflict, whether com mitted by the territorial State or assisting States, before a court, since the victims are either the
civilians in the territorial State or, possibly, members of non-State armed groups.
This situation is in marked contrast with human rights law, at least in the case of
those States which have accepted a right of individual petition. An individual victim can seek redress, uninhibited by the diplomat ic constraints of a State. The obvious solut ion would be to introduce a right of petition for violations of the law of
armed conflict. This will be discussed furthe r in the conclusion.
Lawyers with armed forces should identify precisely to what they take exception .
The armed forces should not object to accountability per se. It helps to keep them
honest. What they should oppose is inappropriate accountability, more accurately
accountability based on inappropriate norms. The key question for the military
should not be the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law, but ensuring
that the solut ion to the co-applicability ofl egal regimes is appropriate. If a law and
order paradigm were applied to extraterritorial activities, the armed forces would
have a well-founded concern, but it would not be the result of extraterritorial applicability. If, on the other hand, the prohibition of arbitrary killings was applied
consistently with the law of armed conflict in military operations and according to
a law and order paradigm in other areas in the territory, to what can the armed
forces legitimately object?
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Two States have objected, in principle, to the extraterritorial applicability of
human rights law, the United States and Israel.88 This raises the same issues as their
objection to the applicability of human rights law when the law of armed conflict is
applicable. In this case, other States may accept some measure of extraterritorial
applicability but only in very limited circwnstances.
The ICl's view regarding the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law is
clear but it is not clear on what it is based. In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ
was dealing with the applicability of human rights law in occupied territory.89 In
DRC v. Uganda, the ICJ was dealing with both occupied Ituri and non -occupied
territory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.90 In both cases, the ICJ assumed the applicability of human rights law. In the contentious case, the ICJ found
the same actions to be violations of both Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Human Rights Committee has had to deal with obligations in occupied territory but only occasionally with other forms of extraterritorial activities. In occupied territory, it has consistently held the occupying power responsible for
ensuring respect of the rights of the occupied population, apparently based on its
control of the territory .91 This position contains both theoretical and practical difficulties . Is the State bound to apply its own obligations or those applicable in the
territory occupied? Given that under the law of armed conflict the occupying
power is not allowed to change the law of the occupied territory unless necessary
for its own security, how is it to provide for those human rights that cannot be delivered by merely executive action?92 Does the occupying power only have negative
obligations, that it is to say that State agents are prohibited themselves from violating human rights law, or is it obliged to protect the population from the risk of violations, including at the hand of third parties? Insofar as the occupying power is in
an analogous position in relation to the population as the sovereign, it might not be
unreasonable to subject the occupying power to analogous obligations.
In one case, the Human Rights Committee had to deal with the extraterritorial
acts of State agents who allegedly cooperated in the infliction of torture, together
with agents of the territorial State.9) Here, there could be no argument as to control
of territory. The State agents could, however, be said to have exercised control over
the detainee. It was not exclusive control. The Human Rights Committee found
the State responsible for a violation. It is not clear whether that was based on the
control of the detainee or on the control over the infliction of the alleged violation.
In General Comment 31, the Human Rights Committee addressed the scope of
the State's obligation to implement human rights obligations.94 The focus was on
implementation, rather than extraterritoriality. The Committee stated that

500

Fran£oise J. Hampson
[tlhis principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the fo rces
of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which
such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national
contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peaceenforcement operation.9S
This is ambiguous. There are certainly some situations in peace support operations
in which individuals are subject to the control of the participating State, such as detention, but that is exceptional. The General Comment, however, suggests that
there may be a more generalized responsibility in such situations.
The Inter-American Court of H uman Rights has not dealt with a case of extraterritorial applicability. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has
done so, but only underthe American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
(American Declaration ) and not the American Convention on H uman Rights. The
forme r does not contain a jurisdictional limitation clause. The Commission has
dealt with the shooting down of an aircraft by the Cuban air force,96 two cases arising out of the US invasion of Grenada,97 one involving the US invasion of Panama 98 and currently has cases involving the responsibility of the United States for
detentions in Guantanamo Bay.99
The European Court of Human Rights is the human rights body which has most
often had to address the issue. The English High Court has found that the cases
cannot be reconciled. loo The earlier cases involved non-military issues, such as the
issuing of passports. WI A significant development occurred in the case of Lojzjdou
v. Turkey, in which the European Court of H uman Rights found that Turkey's occupation of northern Cyprus made it responsible for the full protection of h uman
rights in the territory, including for the acts ofTurkish Cypriot officials. 102 In Ilascu
v. Moldova and Russia, the Court had to address Russia's responsibility for the acts
of officials in Transdniestria. 103 The Court found Russia responsible for the unlawful detention of the applicants. While the Court did not use the word occupation,
its analysis was strongly reminiscent of the reasoning in Lojzjdou. It is not clear
whether the Court is using a law of armed conflict definition of occupation. That
confusion resulted in the highest English court, the House of Lords, determining
that southern Iraq might be occupied for the purposes of the law of armed conflict
but not for the purposes of the applicability of the European Convention for Human
RightS. 104 This is clearly an unsatisfactory conclusion.
The language of the European Court of Human Rights suggested that applicants
detained extraterritorially would be regarded as "within the jurisdiction" of the detaining State. lOS That was applied in the case of Ocalan v. Turkey.l06
The area of remaining uncertainty concerns situations in which people are killed
outside the territory of the State responsible. Bankovic et at. v. Belgium &- 16 members
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ofNAT0107 suggested that such applicants would not be regarded as "within the jurisdiction" but an obiter dictum of the Court in Issa v. Turkey implied that a State

could be in temporary occupation of territory. 108 More recently, Turkey was found
responsible for a killing in the buffer zone in Cyprus. 10'1 These issues will have to be
addressed again in the litigation arising out of the conflict between Georgia and
Russia. Other issues which are likely to come before the Court include detention at
the hands of the British in Basra in the case of AI-Jedda, and killings of persons not
in detention in southern Iraq in the case of Al Skeini. 110
The current position leads to apparently arbitrary results. If a person is shot
dead at point-blank range, he is presumably within the control of the shooter.
What if he is deliberately shot at 50 yards or 500 yards? There is a danger that the
approach of the European Court of Human Rights will encourage States to use air
power rather than ground-based operations, with foreseeable consequences for civilian casualties. It is submitted that a better approach would be to say that a victim
is "within the jurisdiction" ifforeseeablyaffected byan act or omission. This would
not be the same as the cause and effect liability of the law of armed conflict. It
would leave room for mistakes of fact, weapons malfunctions. the acts of the opposing forces and, above all, it would require that the attacking forces foresaw or
should have foreseen the harm to the victim.
It would appear from the case law that a State will have the full range ofhwnan
rights obligations in occupied territory. It is not clear whether the obligations in
question are those of the sovereign or those of the intervening State. It is also uncertain whether the definition of occupation is the same in the law of armed confli ct and in human rights law.
It also seems that persons detained extraterritorially will be within the jurisdiction of the detaining State and therefore entitled to have their rights respected. It
will be recalled that this issue raises problems when a State is engaged in an extraterritorial non-international armed conflict and that parties to the European
Convention for Human Rights would appear to be required to derogate if wishing
to detain on a ground not included in the exhaustive enwneration in Article 5 of
the Convention. It is not d ear to what extent hwnan rights law is applicable extraterritorially in other situations.

IV. The Implication of the Human Rights Obligations of the
Territoria l State for States Assisting It
When, with or without a UN mandate, a State assists another State dealing with a
situation in the territory of the latter, the obligations at issue are not only the extraterritorial obligations of the intervening State. The host State also has obligations
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and it is not acting outside its national territory. The most likely situation would be
a non -international armed conflict in the territorial State, but it could equally involve an international armed conflict. III Clearly, all the parties would be bound by
their law of armed conflict obligations. It is possible that these could vary, depending on mtification. Such differences would be reduced to the extent to which the
treaty rules represent customary law. The issue in this context concerns rather the
impact of the territorial State's human rights obligations.
The first possibility is that the armed forces of the intervening States have the
status of State agents of the territorial State for the purposes of human rights law.
This would appear to be most unlikely, unless the forces came under the command
and control of the territorial State. It seems more likely that the territorial State
would not have direct responsibility but would only have the responsibility to ensure that the intervening States acted in conformity with its own human rights obligations. In other words, the issue would concern the positive obligation of the
territorial State to protect those within its jurisdiction from the risk of violation at
the hands of third parties. The obligations in question might not be the same as the
human rights obligations of the assisting States.ll2 They would presumably be limited to those activities within the mandate of the intervening States. In other words,
Afghanistan might be obliged to ensure that adequate steps were taken by the intervening States to protect the right to life of Afghans, but those States would not have
any responsibility to deliver education , by virtue of Afghanistan's obligations in
that sphere. Where States require assistance, they are unlikely to be in a position to
impose tenns on the assisting States. It is more likely to be a matter of negotiation.
Nevertheless, the obligations of assisting States under general international law
would presumably imply that they should not require the territorial State to breach
its own obligations. II)
This dearly has significant implications for the conduct of ISAF States in Afghanistan. The issue of extraterritoriality would cease to be relevant. The question
would be the implications of Afghanistan's human rights obligations for ISAF
S tates.ll~ The only issue would be the relationship between the law of armed conflict and human rights law. The questions include, first, the circumstances in
which ISAF forces can open fire . Does that vary in different areas, with the law and
order paradigm being prevalent in the north and west of the country and the law
of anned confli ct paradigm being applicable at least in some circumstances in
other areas? Second, in relation to detention, are the ISAF forces authorized, under Afghan law, to detain in circumstances in which Afghan forces could detain?
Has a law been made to that effect? Is the detention regime in Afghan law compatible with the ISAF State's human rights obligations? If the situation is a non international armed conflict, there is no basis fo r detention in the law of armed
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conflict. lIS Detaining powers are entirely dependent on domestic legal provisions.
Afghanistan has not derogated under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. ShouJd it do so? CouJd the ISAF States rely o n an Afghan derogation? Does Afghan law adequately protect the rights of detainees, in the light not
only of law of armed conflict requirements but also of whatever human rights obligations are applicable? Third, particuJar difficulties arise relating to the transfer
of detainees, whether between ISAF States or between ISAF States and Afghanistan. Under human rights law, the detaining State cannot transfer a detainee to the
authorities of another State if there is a real risk of torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. The right at issue is non -derogable.
The first warning of litigation arose in Canada, where the issue of transfers has
been raised. 11 f> It is not known whether cases are waiting for resolution before domestic courts, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Hwnan
Rights Committee or the European Court of Human Rights. In the course of exercising its general monitoring functions, the Human Rights Committee has usually
focused on the responsibility of the intervening State. It did, however, request and
receive a report from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo in the context of examining the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Serbia. ll7 NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) concluded a special agreement with the European Committee on the Prevention of
Torture, enabling the Committee to exercise its functions in KosovO.1l 8
The responsibility of the territorial State to protect the rights of those within its
jurisdiction appears to have implications for States assisting it but the impact of
that responsibility is not yet clear.

V. The Implica tions of a Security Council Mandate
Where an intervening State has a mandate from a recognized authority or where
the presence of foreign forces is recognized by a relevant authority, can the mandate make lawful what wouJd otherwise be unlawful?
If the mandate was contained in a Security Council resolution ad opted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and if the mandate required conduct in breach of
international law, it appears that the resolution wouJd prevail over other legal
rules. 11 9 lt is not dear whether that bald judgment needs to be reviewed in the light
of the passage of time. In particuJar, one may question whether the Security Council couJd require a State to breach a ius cogerlS rule. In practice, Security Council resolutions containing mandates for military forces do not require certain activities;
they merely authorize them. As a resuJt of general principles of intemationallaw
and under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, it must surely be the case that States
504

Fran£oise J. Hampson
cannot implement an authority to act in a fashion which breaches other internationallaw obligations, unless that is necessary to the exercise of the authority. In the
case of the ISAF, this is reinforced by a provision in the preamble to Security Council Resolution 1386 of December 20, 200 1, which requires "that all Afghan forces
must adhere strictly to their obligations under hwnan rights law, including respect
for the rights of women, and under international humanitarian law."
This must represent an authority to act subject to the law of armed conflict and
human rights law obligations. This does not, of course, define what those obligations are. It does call into question the denial of the extraterritorial applicability of
human rights law. Does the mandate subject ISAF States to the full range of human
rights obligations involved in the discharge of the mandate or should it be read as
referring to human rights law insofar as it is applicable?
In relation to killings, the mandate determines whether there is authority to enter a law of armed conflict context or whether the operation is required to operate
in a law and order paradigm. The authority only to use force in self-defense is an
example of the latter. Where a force can use "all necessary means," this implies that
it may use force other than merely in self-defense. This does not mean that it is the
appropriate framework throughout the territory in question or at all times. It is an
authority to enter a law of armed conflict framework when and where necessary
and not a requirement to do so everywhere and at all times. Participating States will
be dependent upon the application of law of armed conflict rules to determine
whether they can enter a law of armed conflict framework. Provided that human
rights law interprets arbitrary killing in a fashion consistent with the law of armed
conflict where that is applicable, and in the "usual" way where it is not, there
should be no real difficulties. Rather, if there are difficulties, it is not attributable to
the law(s) applicable but to the complexity of the situation on the ground.
Detention is a more complicated matter. As already noted, there is a particular
difficulty in relation to the lawful authority to detain under non-international
armed conflict rules. The law of armed conflict does not itself provide that authority. Domestic law for detention in conflict situations may be non-existent and/or
incompatible with human rights law. It is not clear whether States participating in a
peace support operation can rely on domestic authority to detain. A further difficulty for parties to the European Convention for Human Rights is that they can
only detain on specific grounds which do not include internment or administrative
detention. In order to be able to detain on that ground, they are required to derogate but it is not clear whether they can derogate on account of an emergency in the
territory of another State or whether they could benefit from the derogation of the
territorial State. It should be noted that Afghanistan has not derogated from its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It would
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be possible for a UN mandate to fill in the gap in a non-international armed confli ct. It could provide for authority to detain and specify the grounds on which a
person could be detained. In practice, UN mandates simply provide that forces
may use "all necessary means" for the fulfilment of the mandate. Detaining persons
who threaten security is clearly a means to give effect to the mandate but it is not
clear that it is sufficiently specific to constitute a lawful authority to detain. The argument usually used against specificity is that it would require the enumeration of
all the other necessary means. It is submitted that this is not the case. There are particular reasons why the authority to detain must be specific-to comply with respect for human rights law, which is required by virtue of the preambular
paragraph. That does not mean that other m easures need to be enumerated.
Where a mandate gives express authority to take a particular form of action, it
would be difficult to challenge the lawfulness of that action under human rights
laW . 120 It would, however, remain possible to challenge the manner of its execution.
If, for example, a mandate gave authority to detain, a challenge as to the lawfulness
of the fact of detention would appear bound to fail. A challenge as to its arbitrary
application or to the lack of mechanisms of review would not, however, appear to
be precluded by the mandate.
To date, the Human Rights Committee has tended to raise the conduct offorces
involved in peace support operations with the sending States rather than the territorial State. It has done so in the context of the exercise of its monitoring functions .
It has not dealt with an individual complaint arising out of the conduct of such
forces. It has, however, had to address a domestic measure of implementation of a
Security Council resolution. l2l While the issue is slightly different, this does suggest the approach that would be taken to a case involving the implementation of a
mandate in the context of peace support operations.
The Inter-American Commission on H wnan Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights do not appear to have addressed such an issue. While cases
have been submitted under the American Declaration relating to detainees in
Guantanamo, it is not known whether similar cases have been submitted in relation to Iraq and Afghanistan. In Europe, the lead has been taken by the European
Court of Justice, which deals with questions of European Union (EU) law in relation to EU members.122 The case before it was similar to the o ne before the H uman
Rights Committee, in that it dealt with a national measure of implementation of a
Chapter VlI Security Council resolution. m It fo und the national measure to
breach the human rights obligations of Belgium. Both the H uman Rights Committee and the European Court oO ustice emphasized that they were not reviewing the
Security Council resolution itse1fbut only the national measure. The same argument is presumably applicable to national implementation by the executive, in the
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form of the security forces of a State, of a Security Council mandate. The European
Court of Human Rights has only had to address the issue twice. It avoided the issue
by finding that the acts in question (alleged failure to protect the right to life as a result offailing to d ear mines when the presence of mines was known to the French
forces, and alleged unlawful detention by KFOR) were the responsibility of the UN,
rather than of the individual member States complained against. l2.t The European
Court of Human Rights is likely to get the opportunity to revisit the issue. It remains to be seen whether it will be influenced by the decisions of the Human Rights
Committee and the European Court of Justice , which postdate its own admissibility decisions.
It therefore appears likely that human rights bodies will take account of a specific authority to act contained in a mandate, most notably authority to detain.
This does not mean that, in the implementation of the mandate, a State will be free
to disregard its human rights obligations, particularly when there is express reference to an obligation to act in conformity with such obligations. It is not dear
whether the mandate modifies the operation of the normal rules on the scope of
the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law and how such bodies will deal
with derogation in an extraterritorial context.

VI. How Taking Account of Hum an Rights Considerations
Can Contribute to the Effective Conduct of Military Operations
In this section, the focus is not on human rights law but on human rights more
generally. Setting aside legal arguments about the applicability of human rights law
when the law of armed conflict is applicable and about the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law, would it make sense for the military to take account of
human rights considerations?
The objects of the use of military force vary, depending on the nature of the operation. In an international armed conflict, the use of military force is designed to
change the status quo so as to permit the resolution of the previous dispute, either
as a result of the fighting or as a result of negotiation in the context of the changed
situation. Non-international armed conflicts operate in a different context, even if
the actual conduct of military operations appears to be similar. The object is to create
the space in which a political solution can be made. It is often the case that a successful outcome cannot be achieved by military means alone. Whereas in international armed conflicts it is probably generally assumed that the civilian population
supports its own State,llS in non-internat ional armed conflicts it is an independent
constituency. A non-State group needs the civilian population's active or passive
support, so as to facilitate its own operations. The State needs its support in order
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to isolate the non-State group. Where fighters have support from the civilian population, this gives the former a certain legitimacy. Where fighters do not have that
support, it is easier to brand the figh ters as criminals. Whatever the situation in international armed conflicts, in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations it is very
dear that the State needs to act in such a way as to retain or to gain the support of
the civilian population, usually referred to as the battle of hearts and minds. 126
That view is so obvious as to be a platitude, were it not for the fact that States repeatedly play lip service to the notion while acting in a completely contrary fashion.
Routinely, States dealing with an insurgency engage in arbitrary round-ups, and
unnecessarily abusive and destructive searches. They turn a blind eye to allegations
of ill treatment in detention and to alleged unJawful killings. New rules are introduced to deny review of the lawfulness of detention and to replace inconvenient
due process guarantees, thereby making convictions much easier. Nowhere is this
better illustrated than in Northern Ireland. When the British forces were first deployed, they were greeted as saviors by the Roman Catholic population, who
thought the soldiers would protect them from attack by elements in the Protestant
population. That view changed as a result of the conduct of the armed forces. The
British armed forces behaved significantly less badly than the forces of, for example, Guatemala, EI Salvador or Turkey. It is precisely because the British armed
forces take the rule oflaw seriously that much is to be learned from their experience
in Northern Ireland. While some positive changes in behavior were probably the
result of an internal process, there is no doubt that some were b rought about as a
result of human rights litigation before the European Commission of Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. Either those proceedings
speeded up a process that would have occurred anyway, but more slowly, or they
were themselves responsible for change. Only when the forces respected restrictive
rules of engagement, abandoned internment and introduced an extraordinary
range of safeguards against abuse for those detained did the conduct of the armed
forces generally cease to be part of the problem. 127 The reaction to the recent
bombings in Northern Ireland shows that those engaging in political violence are
now seen as merely criminals by the population as a whole.
Over the past forty years, the United States has assumed that its armed forces
would be engaged in international armed conflicts. More recently, it has been recognized that they may be frequently involved in COIN operations.128 The US
armed forces have converted the COIN doctrine into practice with amazing speed.
Nevertheless, it is not always yielding the results hoped for, particularly in Afghanistan. It is submitted that one of the reasons for that is a flawed implementation of
the understandings underlying the COIN doctrine. In order to understand howto
conduct COIN operations, forces need to ask themselves what it would feel like to
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be a civilian in that situation. 129 The priorities and concerns of the civilian population m ay not be those of the armed forces, but if the hearts and minds of the former
need to be won, it is dear which must take precedence. This may mean that armed
forces need to o perate in ways which are likely to entail more casualties am ong
their own ranks than ifthey operated in a different way. Those lives are not wasted.
On the other hand, if the armed forces fight as they want to, this will entail far more
casualties in the long run, including am o ng the armed forces, and will not even
achieve the purpose for which the fighting is taking place. Those lives, whethe r
civilian or military, are wasted. There is not the space here to outline the ways in
which putting yourself in the shoes of a local civilian would impact on military
operations.
It is no t only in the conduct of military operations that a human rights approach
may help avoid problems. It also applies to both the treatment of detainees and
their due process guarantees. There is no need to rehearse here the negative impact
on the perception of US armed forces and also on those forces themselves of the
abandonment of respect for even the prohibition of ill treatm ent contained in
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Instead, a n illustration will be used
from the due process debate. When the original proposal for military commissions
attracted fierce criticism, President Bush set up a genuinely bipartisan group to advise him on how the procedures could be improved.I3O Unfortunately, the members had expertise in US constitutional law and civil rights law but not in
international human rights law. That meant that their only benchm ark was US due
process guarantees. When needing to depart from them, they had no o ther bottom
line. Taking the specific issue of the evidence to be used, a human rights lawyer
would have said that the starting point is that evidence should be made available in
open court and subject to cross-examination. However, in exceptio nal circumstances, it may be necessary to m odify the usual rules. Where, for example, the
prosecution is based on the evidence of an undercover policeman, it may be necessary to protect his identity. This does not necessarily mean that he cannot give evidence at all. He may be able to give evidence in the courtroom but behind a screen.
Or, ifhis voice needs to be distorted, he may be able to give evidence from a n adjacent room, still permitting cross-examination. Provided that there is a genuine
need (as opposed to it being m ore convenient) to modify the rule and provided
that the minimum departure possible has been made from the nonn and , if appropriate, other safeguards have been introduced, there may well be no violation of
human rights law. I3I Where significant departures are to be made from normal due
process guarantees, the State might usefully consider derogating from the relevant
human rights law provision. It is not, o r not simply, that human rights guarantees
are set at a lower threshold than US law. A human rights approach enables the
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introduction of modifications without the abandonment of all notions of rule of
law. The danger with the US approach is that it means normal due process guarantees or nothing.
It is hoped that this all too brief examination of the significance of human rights
values will cause the reader to stop and think. A human rights approach is not
something to be feared. It m ay actually enable armed forces to achieve their purposes more effectively and with fewer casualties.
VII. Conclusion

Both human rights law and the law of armed conflict may be applicable at the same
time. It remains to be seen how human rights bodies will take account of the relevance of the law of armed conflict. It is submitted that two things need to be
avoided. First, finding the right accomm odation between the two bodies of rules
should not be exclusively a matter for human rights bodies, not least because that
would make it subject to the vagaries of particular cases rather than permitting a
more coherent way forward to be developed. Second, it should not be approached
by academics and governmental players in a top-down fashion, as a matter oflegal
rules which simply need to be applied. It is submitted that a more effective approach would be to identify situations on the ground that need to be addressed.
Each issue should be the subject of a document which would not have any legal status but whose contents could be used as guidelines. 132 They could be refined with
the benefit of experience. Each document would address the issue in great detail
and would provide alternatives for the different contexts in which the situation can
arise. L33 In order to produce these documents, there is a need for a small group
composed both of lawyers andof non-lawyers and whose members would have expertise in both human rights law and the lawof armed conflict. It goes without saying that there should be members with military experience. Over tim e, the
guidelines could be incorporated into military operations and into the reasoning of
human rights bodies. This would increase the chances of them applying the same
standards and avoiding conflicts.
It seems d ear that human rights law applies extraterritorially in the case of detainees. Human rights bodies and the l eJare of the view that it also applies to cases
of military occupation but it is not clear how human rights bodies understand the
concept of occupation, and the application of human rights law is not free of theoretical and practical difficulties. What is wholly unclear is the extent to which and
the manner in which it applies in other extraterritorial circumstances, particularly
to the conduct of military operations. The impact of the territorial State's human
rights obligations on assisting States is also uncertain. While a mandate can
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provide authority for particular actions, it does not provide blanket authorization
for a disregard of human rights law in its implementation. It is unclear to what extent a reference to human rights in the mandate "trumps" the usual limits on the
extraterritorial applicability of human rights law. On condition that human rights
law is interpreted in the light of relevant ruJes of the law of armed conflict, armed
forces shouJd not fear the extraterritorial applicability of the former. If all the necessary guidelines discussed above could be produced, States might be more willing
to concede greater scope to the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law.
That wouJd permit the development of a more coherent approach to the question.
A more radical alternative would involve the creation of a right of individual
petition in relation to alleged violations of the law of armed con flict, both in international armed conflicts and in non-international armed conflicts. In some circumstances, this wouJd resuJt in two bodies being available to petitioners: a human
rights body and a new law of armed conflict body. It wouJd need to be determined
whether it wouJd be up to applicants to decide which avenue to pursue or whether
they couJd be required to petition the law of armed conflict body, where the respondent State has accepted its jurisdiction. Demarcation lines would need to be
established between the human rights bodies and the new body. Until a right of individual petition exists for violations of the law of armed conflict, individuals can
be expected to continue to use human rights bodies to attempt to obtain redress.
It is emphatically not being suggested that the sole explanation for the difficuJties of the military operations in Afghanistan are attributable to the failure to take
adequate account of human rights law and human rights values. It is being suggested, however, that those failures have contributed to the current situation. Provided that human rights law takes proper account of the context and of the relevant
rules of the law of armed conflict, human rights law shouJd be seen as a useful tool
in the arsenal of a military lawyer, rather than as an alien and terrifying body of
ruJes to be avoided at all cost.
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